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Abstract
This paper aims at secure and privacy preserving consensus algorithms of networked systems. Due to the technical challenges
behind decentralized design of such algorithms, the existing results are mainly restricted to a network of systems with simplest
first-order dynamics. Like many other control problems, breakthrough of the gap between first-order dynamics and higher-
order ones demands for more advanced technical developments. In this paper, we explore a Paillier encryption based average
consensus algorithm for a network of systems with second-order dynamics, with randomness added to network weights. The
conditions for privacy preserving, especially depending on consensus rate, are thoroughly studied with theoretical analysis and
numerical verification.
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1 Introduction
In recent years research on network security has at-
tracted great attention and significant progresses have
been made in this field. For example, cyber security
of power systems, especially on smart grid, is one of
the most popular topics; see, e.g., [1–3]. Network secu-
rity has also be deeply investigated in many other ap-
plications including but not limited to cyber security
management of industrial systems [4], secure control for
resource-limited adversaries [5], relay attacks [6] and
cloud computing [7]. There are various techniques for
keeping privacy and security of network systems, among
which encryption is an effective but challenging method.
A typical encryption technique involving trusted third-
party can be found in many references such as [8–12]. In
particular, there has been a great impetus within sys-
tems and control community to propose effective tools
to detect and mitigate the effects of cyber threats; see
for example [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] and the references
listed therein. Moreover, integration of encryption tech-
niques inside control and estimation paradigms, which
only deal with encrypted data, becomes an emerging re-
search topic in recent years [18–20].
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Consensus law is perhaps one of the most common pro-
tocols in neworked systems and has been widely stud-
ied not only by systems and control theorists, but also
by physicists, biologists, sociologists, and mathemati-
cians. In systems and control community, this proto-
col has been investigated under consensus of a multi-
agent system (MAS) topic. The early works on con-
sensus of MAS with first-order dynamics can be found
in [21,22], in both continuous-time and discrete-time set-
tings. Over the past decade, extensive efforts have been
devoted to the research on more complicated systems
including second-order systems [23, 24], general linear
systems [25, 26], and even nonlinear heterogeneous sys-
tems [27, 28]. It is known from the history of consen-
sus theory that breakthrough from first-order dynamics
to second-order ones was often significant in many sce-
narios; see a survey paper [29]. It is worth mentioning
that the consensus problem of a second-order MAS with
time-varying topologies still remains open with many
attempts in, e.g., [30, 31], while the same problem for a
first-order MAS has been well studied many years ago
in [32,33].
Given its wide range of applications, privacy and secu-
rity challenges associated with consensus protocol is of
great practical and theoretical importance. As consensus
protocols require information exchange among agents
within a network, if an agent’s state is completely known
by others at one time instant, its whole trajectory might
be reconstructed using the knowledge of dynamics. In
many practical situations, leakage of information is not
allowed. Therefore, researchers are interested in preserv-
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ing privacy of an agent, typically, keeping its initial states
secret from others, during the evolution of network. A
common privacy preserving approach is to use obfusca-
tion to mask the true state values by adding random
noises to the average consensus process; see, e.g., [34,35].
In this noise-based setting, differential privacy is an-
other important tool for database privacy in computer
science [36–38]. The result for privacy preserving max-
imum consensus can be found in [39] where all agents
independently generate and transmit random numbers
before sending out their initial states. The noise-based
obfuscation techniques prevent forming consensus at the
desired average value and achieve consensus in the sta-
tistical mean-square sense. To mitigate such effects on
network performance, researchers are proposing other
secure control protocols. Another common approach is
to employ tools from cryptography.
Application of cryptography-based approaches to a de-
centralized protocol like consensus, especially without a
trusted third-party, is challenging. An early result can
be found in [40] where privacy is preserved at the cost of
depriving participating agents from access to the agreed
value. A more complete result has been reported in a re-
cent paper [41] for first-order agents where a homomor-
phic cryptography-based approach is used to guarantee
privacy and security in a decentralized consensus sce-
nario. Also, randomness is added to the coupling weights
such that the transmission signals via network are of
higher confidentiality. However, in their work, the pri-
vacy analysis result is only for first-order systems, where
leakage of coupling weights directly leads to disclosure
of agents’ states. This phenomenon may not necessarily
happen, depending on the network convergence rate, in
the case of agents with second-order dynamics.
In this paper, we attempt to propose a secure and pri-
vacy preserving average consensus algorithm for second-
order multi-agent systems, using a cryptography-based
approach as well as random network coupling weights.
The research for second-order multi-agent systems has
two-fold contributions.
On one hand, a protocol with random network coupling
weights unavoidably leads to a network of time-varying
weighted topologies. Therefore, the development relies
on a consensus algorithm for time-varying topologies. In
a discrete-time setting, sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for second-order multi-agent systems were revealed
in [24], only for a fixed topology. The result in [42] ap-
plies for time-varying topologies, but with a compulsory
velocity damping, which results in agent velocities agree-
ing at zero. The scenarios studied in [43] and [44] cover
second-order systems, but only for neutrally stable sys-
tems whose eigenvalues are semi-simple with modulus
1. The authors of [45] studied the general scenario as in
this paper; however, with very restrictive network con-
nectivity conditions including fully connected, neighbor
shared, and at least quasi-neighbor shared networks. A
very recent paper for dealing with second-order systems
with time-varying topologies can be found in [46], but
only in a continuous-time setting. As the cornerstone
for establishing a secure and privacy preserving aver-
age consensus algorithm, we first establish conditions
for achieving consensus among second-order agents with
time-varying topology and discrete time dynamics. This
is the first contribution which can be regarded as exten-
sion of a result in [24].
The second contribution lies in development of an al-
gorithm to preserve agents privacy within the network.
The proposed cryptography-based consensus algorithm
with random network weights guarantees privacy for an
agent connected with more than one neighbors. More-
over, we fully examine the scenarios under which leakage
of private information might occur. It is worth mention-
ing that in a network of second-order agents, the two-
dimensional agent states, say position and velocity, are
encrypted and transmitted in a lumped quantity. Hence,
the secure and privacy preserving analysis becomes to-
tally different from that of first-order systems. Moreover,
it turns out that unlike the case of first-order systems,
for a second-order system scenario, the possibility of es-
timating a neighbor’s initial state depends on the net-
work convergence rate, even when the weights are fully
known by agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, graph theory and Paillier encryption are briefly
introduced. The main results including a consensus
algorithm for second-order systems with time-varying
topologies and its cryptography based version are pro-
posed in Section 3. The conditions for privacy preserving
are also revealed in this section. Numerical examples
are presented in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are
drawn in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, some preliminary concepts regarding
graph theory and Paillier cryptosystem are briefly in-
troduced.
2.1 Graph Theory
Let G(V,E) denote a connected undirected graph. The
set of all nodes and edges are presented by V and E, re-
spectively. The elements in V are ν1, ν2, · · · , νN , where
N is the number of nodes, and the elements of the set
E are pairs of nodes denoted by (νi, νj). In a network
associated with graph G(V,E), each node νi represents
an agent and each edge (νi, νj) exists if the agents i and
j communicate with each other. An adjacency matrix
A is defined as follows. For every entry aij , i.e., cou-
pling weight between νi and νj , if (νj , νi) ∈ E, there is
aij > 0, otherwise aij = 0. And the Laplacian matrix
is defined as L = {lij}, where lij = −aij , i 6= j, and
lii =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aij , ∀νi, νj ∈ V.
2
2.2 Paillier Encryption
2.2.1 Asymmetric Cryptosystem
In the asymmetric cryptosystem, there are two types of
keys, namely, a private key KPrv available only to each
individual for decryption and a public key KPub accessi-
ble by all entities only for encryption purposes. Consider
two individuals, say Alice and Bob, who intend to com-
municate in a secure way so that a third party, call it Eve,
cannot recover the message. To achieve this, Alice gener-
ates a public key KPubA that everyone, perhaps including
Eve, knows about. Then before Bob sends a message m
to Alice, it encrypts it as EA(m) using KPubA provided by
Alice. However, the only way to decrypt the ciphertext
EA(m) is through the private key KPrvA , which is only
known by Alice. Since Eve does not have access to the
private key PPrvA , information privacy remains intact.
2.2.2 Semi-homomorphic Property of Paillier Cryp-
tosystem
The Paillier encryption exploited in this paper is a
certain class of asymmetric cryptosystem that adopts
semi-homomorphic encryption techniques [47]. Ho-
momorphic encryption allows operations to be done
on ciphertext such that after decryption the results
remain equivalent to those obtained from perform-
ing some other operations on the associated plain
text. A fully-homomorphic encryption has the prop-
erty that for an arbitrary function f operating on
encrypted data E(mi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which are ob-
tained from encryption of messages mi under the same
public key, there always exists a function f ′ such that
E(f ′(m1,m2, . . . ,mn)) = f(E(m1), E(m2), . . . , E(mn)).
In a semi-homomorphic cryptosystem, the above prop-
erty only holds for some limited classes of functions.
For instance, Paillier encryption has additive semi-
homomorphic property. Under Paillier encryption, the
following properties hold,
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2)(E(m1))n = E(n ·m1), (1)
where m1 and m2 are plaintexts and E denotes encryp-
tion function.
A brief review of Paillier algorithm is demonstrated in
Algorithm 1.
3 Main Results
In this section, we study how to exploit Paillier cryp-
tosystem to ensure information privacy of agents with
double integrator dynamics which are connected under
the consensus law. Our objective is to make sure that
during the process of reaching consensus, the states of all
agents remain secret from their neighbors. We present
a novel strategy which is capable of keeping agents’ pri-
vacy over undirected graphs. Moreover, we study con-
ditions under which the information associated with an
Algorithm 1 Paillier Cryptosystem
Key Generation:
1. Generate 2 large prime number p, q, where
gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1.
2. λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1), and modulus n = p · q.
3. Define Zn = {x|x ∈ Z, 0 ≤ x < n},
Z∗n = {x|x ∈ Z, 0 ≤ x < n, gcd(x, n) = 1}.
4. Select an integer g ∈ Z∗n2 that satisfies
gcd(L(gλ mod n2), n) = 1,
where the function L is defined by
L(x) =
x− 1
n
,
x ∈ {x < n2|x ≡ 1 mod n}.
Public key is (n, g). Private key is (λ).
Encryption:
1. Generate a random integer r ∈ (0, n).
2. Compute
c = gm · rn mod n2.
Decryption:
1. Compute
m =
L(cλ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
mod n
agent, i.e., its position or velocity, might be leaked to an
eavesdropper or a curious neighbor. It is noted that the
possibility of leakage due to disclosure of private keys is
out of the scope of the current paper and is not consid-
ered.
3.1 Second-order Systems
Consider a second-order system with its dynamics rep-
resented in discrete-time form as follows
p
(k+1)
i = p
(k)
i + Tv
(k)
i ,
v
(k+1)
i = v
(k)
i + Tu
(k)
i , i = 1, 2 . . . , N,
(2)
where k is the time index, T is the sampling time, and
pi, vi ∈ R are the position and velocity associated with
the agent i, respectively. Without loss of generality, we
let the sampling time be unity throughout this paper.
The following control law drives the group of agents in
(2) toward reaching consensus asymptotically
u
(k)
i =
∑
j∈Ni
γ1a
(k)
ij (p
(k)
j − p(k)i ) + γ2
∑
j∈Ni
a
(k)
ij (v
(k)
j − v(k)i ),
(3)
where a
(k)
ij s are entries of adjacency matrix A derived
from a connected and undirected network topology, γ1,
3
γ2 are the coefficients and Ni is the set of agent i’s neigh-
bors.
Let
p(k) =
(
p
(k)
1 , p
(k)
2 , · · · , pN (k)
)T
,
v(k) =
(
v
(k)
1 , v
(k)
2 , · · · , vN (k)
)T
,
x(k) =
(
(p(k))T, (v(k))T
)T
.
With the definition of the Laplacian matrix L(k), sub-
stituting (3) into (2) yields
x(k+1) = F (k)x(k), (4)
where F (k) =
(
IN IN
−γ1L(k) IN − γ2L(k)
)
. If the system
has a fixed topology, the dynamics in (4) shrinks to
x(k+1) = Fx(k). (5)
For an undirected and connected topology, the Laplacian
matrix L attains an eigenvalue 0 associated with a right
eigenvector 1N and a left eigenvector 1
T
N ; see, e.g. [48].
Thus, one can easily conclude that F has eigenvalue 1 as-
sociated with algebraic multiplicity two, associated with
right eigenvectors (1TN ,0
T
N )
T and (0TN ,1
T
N )
T. Moreover,
since L is symmetric, the matrix F has left eigenvectors
(1TN ,0
T
N ) and (0
T
N ,1
T
N ).
We need the following definitions which are required for
the further developments presented in this paper.
Definition 1 A group of discrete-time second-order
agents with dynamics as in (2) is said to reach (asymp-
totic) consensus if the following property holds for any
initial conditions:
lim
k→+∞
p
(k)
i −p(k)j = 0, lim
k→+∞
v
(k)
i −v(k)j = 0, ∀i, j ∈ V.
The above definition is concerned about consensus as
k → ∞, which is an asymptotic property. To explicitly
describe a consensus behavior in finite time, we introduce
the following definition.
Definition 2 A group of discrete-time second-order
agents with dynamics as in (2) is said to reach δ-practical
consensus at time kc if
|p(k)j − p(k)i | < δ, ∀k > kc and i, j ∈ V. (6)
It is noted that the above definition demands for global
knowledge of positions and/or velocities of agents.
Therefore, we introduce the following definition that
relies only on the local information.
Definition 3 In a group of discrete-time second-order
agents with dynamics as in (2), two agents, say i and j,
are said to reach local δ-agreement at time ka if
|p(ka)j − p(ka)i | ≤ δ. (7)
We now revisit a lemma from [24] that provides condi-
tions for a group of agents with dynamics as in (2) to
reach consensus.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a group of discrete-time second-
order agents with dynamics as in (2) is connected under
a fixed topology with the control law (3). Then the closed-
loop system in (5) reaches consensus with
γ2 > γ1 > 0,
γ1 − 2γ2 > −4
µi
,
(8)
where µis are nonzero eigenvalues of the Laplacian ma-
trix L, if and only if the associated topology is connected.
Proof: To be self-contained, the proof in [24] is briefly
presented here. Given the connectivity of the topology,
the Laplacian matrix of the system has an eigenvalue
0 associated with an eigenvector 1N . The condition (8)
ensures that the rest eigenvalues of L are negative, which
makes the remaining eigenvalues of F stay within the
unit circle. Let J be the Jordan canonical form of F
associated with an invertible matrix P , then we have
F = PJP−1
= P

1 1
0 1
02×(2N−2)
0(2N−2)×2 J˜(2N−2)×(2N−2)
P−1, (9)
where J˜ is a Jordan canonical form matrix containing
all the eigenvalues of J except an eigenvalue 1 with al-
gebraic multiplicity two. The vectors 1N (1
T
N ,0
T
N ) and
1
N (0
T
N ,1
T
N ) are the first and second rows of P , respec-
tively. One should notice that all eigenvalues of J˜ are
smaller than one and limk→∞ J˜k = 0. Then by substi-
tuting (9) into (5), we calculate the norm
lim
k→∞
∥∥∥∥∥
[
p(k)
v(k)
]
−
[
1
N
∑N
j=1(p
(0)
j + kv
(0)
j )
1
N
∑N
j=1 v
(0)
j
]
⊗ 1N
∥∥∥∥∥
= lim
k→∞
∥∥∥∥∥F k
[
p(0)
v(0)
]
−
[
1
N
∑N
j=1(p
(0)
j + kv
(0)
j )
1
N
∑N
j=1 v
(0)
j
]
⊗ 1N
∥∥∥∥∥
=0.
(10)
Theorem 1 There exists an admissible variation range
δA > 0 such that all agents in the aggregated model (4)
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under an undirected graph topology reach consensus if the
following conditions are satisfied
‖A(k) −A(0)‖ < δA, ∀k ≥ 0,
γ2 > γ1 > 0,
γ1 − 2γ2 > −4
µ
(0)
i
,
(11)
where µ
(0)
i s are nonzero eigenvalues of the Laplacian ma-
trix L(0), A is the adjacency of topology matrix, and ‖A‖
denotes the max norm of A.
Proof: Firstly we calculate the Jordan canonical form of
the matrix F (0):
F (0) = PJP−1
= P

1 1
0 1
02×(2N−2)
0(2N−2)×2 J˜(2N−2)×(2N−2)
P−1. (12)
Given that the matrices F (k) and F (0) share common
eigenvectors, by using the same matrix P , we can de-
compose F (k) as
F (k) = PH(k)P−1
= P

1 1
0 1
02×(2N−2)
0(2N−2)×2 H˜
(k)
(2N−2)×(2N−2)
P−1, (13)
where H(0) = J and H˜(0) = J˜ . One should note that
using the same P , for k = 0, 1, . . . , makes H˜(k)s not
necessarily be Jordan blocks when k ≥ 1. However, given
the structure of the matrices F (k)s, all of them share
two common left eigenvectors and two right eigenvectors,
therefore H(k)s have a common block
[
1 1
0 1
]
.
We now apply the following coordinate transformation
x¯(k) = P−1x(k) (14)
and let x¯(k) =
[
σk
ζk
]
for σk ∈ R2 and ζk ∈ R2N−2.
One should note that consensus is reached if ζk → 0 as
k →∞.
Consider a Lyapunov function
Yk = ζ
T
kQζk. (15)
With the help of (4), (13), (14) and (15), one can write
Yk+1 − Yk = ζTk+1Qζk+1 − ζTkQζk
= ζTk ((H˜
(k))TQH˜(k) −Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(k)
)ζk. (16)
According to Lemma 1, the conditions (11) ensure that
all eigenvalues of H˜(0) are inside the unit circle, which
means there exists a positive definite matrixQ such that
R(0) = ((J˜)
T
QJ˜−Q) is negative definite. As the change
in eigenvalues of a matrix is a continuous function of
its entries, one can conclude that R(k) is also a negative
definite matrix for a slight variation in entries of the
matrix A.
3.2 Privacy-preserving Consensus In Undirected Net-
works
First of all, preserving an agent’s privacy throughout
the paper is defined as maintaining its initial states hid-
den from other agents. In this subsection, we introduce a
strategy for preserving privacy among a group of agents
with dynamics as in (2) under an undirected network
topology. In particular, we provide a paradigm that man-
ages encryption and information exchange policies to
maintain privacy of agents’ information from their neigh-
bors while achieving consensus among them.
3.2.1 Confidential Strategy
To explain our proposed method in this subsection, we
focus on an agent, say Alice, which communicates with
other agents within its neighbor set under an undirected
topology. One should note that all agents are employing
the same protocol as in (3), if there is no state informa-
tion leakage happening in process of calculating u
(k)
A , i.e.,
Alice’s control input, the privacy of all agents remains
intact.
The information exchange strategy is the same between
Alice and its neighbors, thus without loss of generality,
we only need to examine the interaction between Alice
and one of its neighbors, say Bob.
In the following, we examine the possibility of informa-
tion leakage from Bob to Alice in the process of compu-
tation of u
(k)
A . To this end, let us expand Alice’s com-
mand input as follows
u
(k)
A = γ1a
(k)
AB(p
(k)
B − p(k)A ) + γ2a(k)AB(v(k)B − v(k)A )︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
(k)
AB
+
∑
j∈NA−{Bob}
γ1a
(k)
Aj (p
(k)
j − p(k)A ) + γ2a(k)Aj (v(k)j − v(k)A ),
where NA denotes set of Alice’s neighbors and a(k)AB is an
entry of the adjacency matrix A corresponding to Alice
and Bob. Then Bob’s contribution in u
(k)
A is
u
(k)
AB = γ1a
(k)
AB(p
(k)
B − p(k)A ) + γ2a(k)AB(v(k)B − v(k)A ). (17)
Similarly, the contribution of Alice to u
(k)
B can be written
as u
(k)
BA.
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Remark 1 According to (3) and (17), u
(k)
AB is necessary
information that Alice requires from Bob to compute u
(k)
A ,
which is the input to update v
(k)
A . In this scenario, if the
states of Bob can be deduced from u
(k)
AB, its privacy cannot
be guaranteed under any secure communication protocol.
For a first-order system, u
(k)
AB in (17) reduces to
u
(k)
AB = a
(k)
AB(p
(k)
B − p(k)A )
and the state of Bob can be directly computed from u
(k)
AB
with a
(k)
AB known, i.e.,
p
(k)
B =
u
(k)
AB
a
(k)
AB
+ p
(k)
A .
The situation for a second-order system is more compli-
cated as u
(k)
AB in (17) contains lumped quantity of posi-
tion and velocity. Nevertheless, the computation of Bob’s
states is still possible when it has a sole neighbor. More
specifically, at the two steps of k = 0 and k = 1, the two
messages received from Bob by Alice are as follows:
u
(0)
AB = γ1a
(0)
AB(p
(0)
B − p(0)A ) + γ2a(0)AB(v(0)B − v(0)A ),
u
(1)
AB = γ1a
(1)
AB(p
(1)
B − p(1)A ) + γ2a(1)AB(v(1)B − v(1)A ).
(18)
Also, Bob’s states obey the second-order dynamics
p
(1)
B = p
(0)
B + v
(0)
B ,
v
(1)
B = v
(0)
B + u
(0)
B .
(19)
As the topology is undirected and Bob has one sole
neighbor, Alice is able to measure
u
(0)
B = u
(0)
BA = −u(0)AB . (20)
The other four variables, i.e., p
(0)
B , p
(1)
B , v
(0)
B and v
(1)
B , can
be computed from the set of four equations in (18) and
(19). In particular, Bob’s initial states are
p
(0)
B =p
(0)
A −
γ1 + γ2
γ21
u
(0)
AB
a
(0)
AB
+
γ2
γ21
u
(1)
AB
a
(1)
AB
+
γ22
γ21
(v
(0)
A − v(1)A − u(0)AB),
v
(0)
B =v
(0)
A −
1
γ1
(
u
(1)
AB
a
(1)
AB
− u
(0)
AB
a
(0)
AB
)
+
γ2
γ1
(v
(1)
A − v(0)A + u(0)AB).
(21)
Thus, Bob’s privacy cannot be maintained irrelevant of
which kind of security protocol is applied.
If Bob has more than one neighbors, the above compu-
tation becomes invalid. For this scenario, we establish
privacy preserving conditions in the following theorem,
for a group of agents with second-order dynamics under
undirected topologies. Also, it is noted that the weights
between agents and its neighbors are public information.
In order to analyze the privacy of agents’ states during
consensus process, let pˆ
(k)
B and vˆ
(k)
B be the estimation
values of Bob’s position and velocity, calculated by Al-
ice. Then the estimation errors of Bob’s initial states are
defined as follows.
εp = pˆ
(0)
B − p(0)B ,
εv = vˆ
(0)
B − v(0)B .
(22)
Theorem 2 Consider two agents with dynamics as in
(2), called Alice and Bob, which are connected via an
undirected network topology under the control law (3).
Suppose a
(k)
AB is public information. Then, when the local
δ-agreement between Alice and Bob is reached at time ka,
by collecting u
(k)
AB, p
(k)
A and v
(k)
A , k = 1, 2, · · · , ka, Bob’s
initial position and velocity can be estimated by Alice with
errors εp and εv, respectively, which satisfy
|εp| ≤ ( γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kaδ,
|εv| ≤ γ1γ
ka−1
2
(γ2 − γ1)ka δ.
(23)
Proof: According to the control law (3), Alice obtains a
set of equations based on the information u
(k)
AB collected
from k = 0 to k = ka − 1, i.e.,
u
(0)
AB =γ1a
(0)
AB(p
(0)
B − p(0)A ) + γ2a(0)AB(v(0)B − v(0)A ),
...
u
(ka−1)
AB =γ1a
(ka−1)
AB (p
(ka−1)
B − p(ka−1)A )
+ γ2a
(ka−1)
AB (v
(ka−1)
B − v(ka−1)A ).
(24)
Next, with the knowledge of (2), Alice can also construct
another set of equations as below
p
(1)
B =p
(0)
B + v
(0)
B ,
...
p
(ka)
B =p
(ka−1)
B + v
(ka−1)
B .
(25)
At time ka, define
δp = p
(ka)
B − pˆ(ka)B . (26)
By setting pˆ
(ka)
B = p
(ka)
A , one has |δp| ≤ δ by Definition 3.
6
Substituting (26) into the last equation of (25) provides
p
(1)
B =p
(0)
B + v
(0)
B ,
...
p
(ka−1)
B =p
(ka−2)
B + v
(ka−2)
B ,
pˆ
(ka)
B =p
(ka−1)
B + v
(ka−1)
B − δp.
(27)
Next, by eliminating v
(k)
B , k = 0, . . . , ka−1, in (24) using
(25), one obtains the following set of equations, for k =
0, . . . , ka − 1,
(γ2− γ1)p(k)B = γ2p(k+1)B − γ1p(k)A − γ2v(k)A −
u
(k)
AB
a
(k)
AB
. (28)
Given the above equation by invoking (26), we can ex-
press the position and velocity of Bob as
p
(k)
B =(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka−kpˆ(ka)B +
ka−k−1∑
T=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
Tϕk+T
+ (
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka−kδp,
v
(k)
B =−
γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka−kpˆ(ka)B −
γ2 − γ1
γ2
ϕk
− γ1
γ2
ka−k−1∑
T=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
Tϕk+T − γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka−kδp,
k = 0, 1, . . . , ka,
(29)
where
ϕk =
1
γ1 − γ2 (γ1p
(k)
A + γ2v
(k)
A +
u
(k)
AB
a
(k)
AB
).
By letting k = 0 in (29), Bob’s initial states, i.e., its
position and velocity, can be obtained as
p
(0)
B =(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka pˆ
(ka)
B +
ka−1∑
k=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kϕk
+ (
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kaδp,
v
(0)
B =−
γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka pˆ
(ka)
B −
γ2 − γ1
γ2
ϕ0
− γ1
γ2
ka−1∑
k=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kϕk − γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kaδp.
(30)
Alice can estimates Bob’s initial states, i.e., p
(0)
B and v
(0)
B
through the following estimation law :
pˆ
(0)
B =(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka pˆ
(ka)
B +
ka−1∑
k=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kϕk,
vˆ
(0)
B =−
γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
ka pˆ
(ka)
B −
γ2 − γ1
γ2
ϕ0
− γ1
γ2
ka−1∑
k=0
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kϕk.
(31)
Finally, with respect to (22), (30) and (31), the estima-
tion error of Bob’s states computed by Alice are as fol-
lows,
εp =(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kaδp,
εv =
γ1
γ2
(
γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kaδp.
(32)
Since |δp| < δ, (32) implies (23) and the proof is finished.
Remark 2 For the sequence k = 0, 1, · · · , one can define
δ(k) = |p(k)A − P (k)B |.
Obviously, Alice and Bob reaches local δ(k)-agreement at
time k. Theorem 2 claims that the estimation error of
Bob’s initial position at time k is bounded by
|εp(k)| ≤ ( γ2
γ2 − γ1 )
kδ(k) =
δ(k)
(γ2−γ1γ2 )
k
.
In a consensus process, one has δ(k) → 0 as k → ∞. If
the consensus convergence is sufficiently fast in the sense
of
δ(k)
(γ2−γ1γ2 )
k
→ 0, as k →∞,
Alice may estimate Bob’s initial position with a suffi-
ciently small estimation error. However, if the consensus
convergence is not fast, sufficiently precise estimation of
Bob’s initial position becomes impossible, that is, Bob’s
privacy is preserved. The same arguments also hold for
estimation of Bob’s initial velocity.
Remark 3 It is worthwhile noting that the computa-
tion of estimation error in (23) depends on achieving
local δ-agreement at time ka. However, in a privacy-
preserving consensus states of neighbors are secret in-
formation, which means ka cannot be obtained directly
by agents. Consider the two agents with specifications
stated in Theorem 2. Alice has only access to its own
states and Bob’s message u
(k)
AB. Since the states of Bob
remain hidden from Alice, it becomes impossible for it
to directly attain information of ka even with the knowl-
edge of permissible error δ. Furthermore, in a second-
order system, u
(k)
AB = 0 does not imply |p(k)B − p(k)A | = 0
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or |v(k)B − v(k)A | = 0. However, it is possible to indirectly
estimate the value of ka using the u
(k)
AB .
3.2.2 Exchanging Information And Operation
Theorem 2 demonstrates that in an undirected topol-
ogy the knowledge of link weights, i.e., a
(k)
ij , relating
two neighbors, say Alice and Bob, enable Alice to re-
construct the states of Bob by exploiting the collected
inputs u
(k)
AB from Bob and its own states, provided that
the consensus convergence rate is sufficiently large. To
overcome this shortcoming, we exploit a methodology
initially introduced by [41] for networks of agents with
first-order dynamics. In this approach, the weight a
(k)
AB
is hidden from both Alice and Bob by being decoupled
into two factors, with one factor stored by Alice, called
a
(k)
A , and the other by Bob, called a
(k)
B . In this technique,
the weighting between Alice and Bob can be written as
a
(k)
AB = a
(k)
A · a(k)B . (33)
The decoupled weights a
(k)
A and a
(k)
B are generated ran-
domly in a specified range so that the first inequal-
ity in (11) is satisfied. More specifically, one can as-
sign uniform samples for a
(k)
A and a
(k)
B from the range
(
√
a
(0)
AB − δA,
√
a
(0)
AB + δA).
We introduce Algorithm 2 that exploits the Paillier cryp-
tosystem to maintain the privacy of information between
Alice and Bob. In Algorithm 2, for the sake of simplicity
of notation we omit the parameter k.
Theorem 3 Consider a group of agents with second-
order dynamics as in (2) under the control law (3) and the
conditions (11). Given that all agents adopt Algorithm 2
asymptotic consensus can be reached. Moreover, if an
agent has more than one neighbor its initial states cannot
be learned by them.
Proof: Using the semi-homomorphic property of Pail-
lier encryption and Theorem 1, asymptotic consensus
can be easily established. If Alice is Bob’s solo neighbor,
states of Bob will be available to Alice after consensus
is reached at some time say, kc. This is because in this
case we have u
(k)
AB = u
(k)
A and when consensus is reached
v
(kc)
A = v
(kc)
B . Moreover, according to (3), in an undi-
rected network it holds that u
(k)
AB +u
(k)
BA = 0. Then Alice
can calculate Bob’s state v
(k)
B using
v
(k)
B = v
(kc)
A +
kc−1∑
i=k
u
(i)
AB (34)
This holds irrespective of the encryption method Bob
and Alice exploiting in their communication. Now if Bob
has more than one neighbors, since the decoupled term
a
(k)
B is only kept by Bob, substituting a
(k)
AB into equation
Algorithm 2 Information exchange in undirected net-
works
Preparation (Alice):
(1) At initial time k = 0, generate a pair of public key
KPubA and private key K
Prv
A , then send K
Pub
A to all its
neighbors, including Bob.
(2) At time k, generate a random number
aA ∈ (
√
a
(0)
AB − δA,
√
a
(0)
AB + δA).
Preparation (Bob):
(1) At time k, generate a random number
aB ∈ (
√
a
(0)
AB − δA,
√
a
(0)
AB + δA).
Step 1 (Alice):
(1.1) Encrypt position: pA → −pA E−→ EA(−pA) sent to−−−−→
Bob.
(1.2) Encrypt velocity: vA → −vA E−→ EA(−vA) sent to−−−−→
Bob.
Step 2 (Bob):
(2.1) Operate position: pB
E−→ EA(pB) → EA(pB) ·
EA(−pA) = EA(pB − pA) → (EA(pB − pA))γ1aB =
EA(γ1aB · (pB − pA)).
(2.2) Operate velocity: vB
E−→ EA(vB) → EA(vB) ·
EA(−vA) = EA(vB − vA) → (EA(vB − vA))γ2aB =
EA(γ2aB · (vB − vA)).
(2.3) Combine p and v: EA(γ1aB · (pB − pA)) · EA(γ2aB ·
(vB − vA)) = EA(γ1aB · (pB − pA) + γ2aB · (vB −
vA))
sent to−−−−→ Alice.
Step 3 (Alice):
Decrypt and operate:
EA(γ1aB · (pB − pA) + γ2aB · (vB − vA)) E
−1
−−→ γ1aB ·
(pB − pA) + γ2aB · (vB − vA) ×aA−−−→ γ1aAB · (pB − pA) +
γ2aAB · (vB − vA) = uAB .
(24) with a
(k)
A · a(k)B provides Alice more unknowns but
no additional equations. This makes the set of equations
collected by Alice be unsolvable. Therefore privacy of
Bob’s states remains intact. This completes the proof.
Theorems 2 and 3 provide the conditions for privacy
preserving consensus of second-order systems, in the
cases of known coupling weights and unknown coupling
weights, respectively. The corresponding conditions for
first-order systems have been studied in [41]. Table 1
outlines different scenarios that might raise depending
on the agents’ dynamics, their number of neighbors and
availability of coupling weights information. It demon-
strates the possible violation of individual’s privacy and
time required for that to happen.
4 Simulation
In this section, some numerical examples are presented
to demonstrate how the privacy is preserved under Algo-
rithm 2. We implement the Paillier method written in C
language [49]. During the simulation, modular bits used
for generating keys of Paillier encryption are set to 64.
We consider the topology in Fig. 1 with the associated
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Coupling Weights
No. of
Neigh-
bors
known
(1st-order)
known
(2nd-order)
unknown
1 1 step 2 steps when con-
sensus
reached
≥ 2 1 step depending
on consensus
convergance
speed
never
Table 1
Possibility of privacy violation for an agent and its required
time.
Fig. 1. An undirected network composed of four nodes.
Laplacian matrix 0.1×

2 −1 −1 0
−1 2 −1 0
−1 −1 3 −1
0 0 −1 1
. Moreover, the
other parameters are set as γ1 = 0.3, γ2 = 0.6, p
(0)
A = 20,
p
(0)
B = 30, p
(0)
C = 50, p
(0)
D = 90, v
(0)
A = 30, v
(0)
B = −20,
v
(0)
C = 10, and v
(0)
D = −40.
Since the communication protocols between every two
agents are same, we focus on the states of agents A and
B in Fig. 1.
Fig. 2 demonstrates how the information is exchanged
under Algorithm 2. In this figure, we present states, i.e.,
position and velocity of agent A, as well as information
sent from agent B to A, i.e., u
(k)
AB . In Algorithm 2, if a ma-
licious party hacks into the communication channel be-
tween A and B, the available information is EA(−p(k)A ),
EA(−v(k)A ) and u(k)AB , which is transmitted in steps 1-3,
respectively. The figures show that the encrypted mes-
sages contain no useful information for the malicious
party and thus ensure network security.
Fig. 3a and Fig. 3c exhibit the position and velocity
trajectories of all four agents, accordingly. For the case
in which agents A and B have complete knowledge about
a
(k)
AB , i.e. no decoupling is applied, the initial position
and velocity components associated with agent B can be
estimated by agent A. This is illustrated in Fig. 3b and
Fig 3d. One can observe that pˆ
(0)
B → p(0)B and vˆ(0)B → v(0)B
as k →∞. One should note that at even though at k = 5
the consensus is not reached but since local δ-agreement
is achieved between agents A and B for a small δ, the
estimated values of agent B’s initial states are accurate.
As expected by Theorem 2, in Fig. 3, agent A estimates
B’s initial states with error values which converge to 0
as time k →∞. It occurs in a consensus process with a
sufficiently fast convergence rate. Next, with all the cou-
pling weights aijs multiplied by a factor 0.8, the consen-
sus convergence rate reduces accordingly. In this case,
estimation of B’s initial states is inaccurate as illustrated
in Fig. 4. That is, B’s privacy still remains intact.
Finally, as far as the computation complexity of the pro-
posed scheme is concerned, it was recorded that the av-
erage computation time for each step of simulation is
174.9 ms on a laptop with 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 Dell lap-
top using Matlab R2017a, which runs Linux on a Virtual
Machine. Each step contains 12 encryption processes and
8 decryption processes associated with all 4 agents.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a cryptography-based
secure consensus protocol for networks of second-order
agents. The proposed protocol achieved consensus
asymptotically among all agents while keeping the pri-
vacy of individuals intact through decoupling and vary-
ing the communication weights within some admissible
range. In addition, for the case which the communica-
tion weights information is available to all agents, we
have performed a full privacy analysis and shown that
violation of individual’s privacy depends on the network
convergence rate.
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(b) Encrypted states of agent A as in step 1.1 and 1.2 of
Algorithm 2.
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(c) Message sent from agent B to A as in Step 2.3 of
Algorithm 2.
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(d) Decrypted version of the message sent from B to A
as in step 3 of Algorithm 2.
Fig. 2. Exchanged information under Algorithm 2.
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(b) The initial position of agent B and its associated
estimates computed by agent A.
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(c) Velocity trajectories of all four agents.
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(d) The initial velocity of agent B and its associated
estimate computed by agent A.
Fig. 3. All four agents’ position and velocity trajectories and
estimation of agent B’s initial states calculated by agent A
in a fast consensus network.
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(b) The initial position of agent B and its associated
estimates computed by agent A.
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(d) The initial velocity of agent B and its associated
estimate computed by agent A.
Fig. 4. All four agents’ position and velocity trajectories and
estimation of agent B’s initial states calculated by agent A
in a slow consensus network.
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